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The Regulation of Technical Data Under The Arms 
Export Control Act of 1976 and The Export 
Administration Act of 1979: A Matter of 
Executive Discretion 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Concern in government circles over U.S. controls on technology exports is 
mounting.! The Reagan Administration is particularly concerned about the 
increasing loss of technology to the Soviet Union and other unfriendly countries 
through legal and illegal channels.2 Deficiencies in current export regulation are 
partly responsible for a growing national problem - the increasing occurrence 
of the illegal sale of skills and secrets to foreign nations by former military and 
intelligence officials for their personal benefit.3 The Reagan Administration 
asserts that technology leaks, by whatever means, have contributed significantly 
to the strategic needs of unfriendly nations. 4 These events have prompted the 
I. See remarks by Michael]. O'Neil, Chief Counsel of House Intelligence Panel, and Rep. Edward P. 
Boland (D. Mass.), Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, L.A. Times, Oct. 26, 1981, at AI, 
col. 4 (regarding concern with whether current U.S. governmental policy can effectively deal with 
secret shipments of high technology military equipment to unfriendly countries). 
In response to criticisms of current U.S. policy from American industry, Assistant Commerce 
Secretary LIwrence Brady said, "the control system is plagued by ad hocism and is neither clear nor 
predictable .... Export controls will be used for contingencies as a foreign policy tool but not to the 
disadvantage of U.S. industry." U.S. Export Weekly (BNA), No. 359, C-2 (May 26, 1981). 
In the same month, Government Accounting Office (GAO) International Division Director, Frank C. 
Conahan told a Senate Subcommittee that the government's criteria for including technology under 
controls are "too broad - far fewer items are actually being controlled; much of the system is simply a 
paper process which overly burdens U.S. exporters and reduces the time available to review important 
applications." Conahan also reported that review of critical c.ases needs to be improved, and that 
"serious constraints exist to deterring unauthorized exports." U.S. Export Weekly (BNA), No. 356, A-3 
(May 5, 1981). 
2. See Washington Post, Jan. 9, 1982, at A5, col. I. See also N.Y. Times,Jan. 20, 1982, at A8, col. I. See 
generaUy, Keeping High- Tech Secrets, Newsweek, Jan. 25, 1982, at 34. Some valuable American technology 
is lost to the Soviets due to illegal activities such as theft and espionage. See Washington Post, Jan. 9, 
1982, at A5, col. I. However, much of the loss of American technology to the Soviets occurs through 
legal channels such as legitimate academic exchanges. See id.; see also Keeping High-Tech Secrets, News-
week, Jan. 25, 1982, at 34. 
3. The House and Senate Intelligence committees are each conducting closed-door inquiries into the 
matter of high-technology leaks by former intelligence officials. L.A. Times, Oct. 26, 1981, at AI, col. 4; 
see also Boston Globe, Oct. 10, 1981, at 1, col. 2; Washington Post, Jan. 9,1982, at A5, col. I. 
4. For example, during the summer of 1981, a fisherman off the coast of North Carolina came across 
a Soviet Sonar buoy. Upon examination by Pentagon officials, the buoy was found to contain a 
sophisticated electronic package that could transmit information on water temperature, current speed 
and salinity - such information being of great value to Soviet submarines at sea. Most disturbing to 
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Administration to attempt to restrict the flow of valuable technology from the 
United States to unfriendly countries.5 In light of the recent discoveries of illegal 
technological exports and the Reagan Administration's efforts to crack down on 
the flow of technology out of the United States, an examination of U.S. controls 
on technology transfers is particularly timely.6 
This Comment examines U.S. unilateral technological export controls.7 Spe-
cifically, this Comment focuses on the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (AECA),8 
and the Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA),9 the two most important 
pieces of U.S. legislation affecting technological exports. 10 The Comment dis-
government officials, however, was the fact that the electronic device was guided by replicas of circuitry 
made by RCA corporation in the United States. Keeping High-Tech Secrets, Newsweek, Jan. 25, 1982, at 
34. 
Ii. Boston Globe, Feb. 24, 1982, at 4, col. 1. Among the methods sought to be advanced by the Reagan 
Administration are: (1) a tightening-up on existing legislation which restricts the flow of American 
technology, see N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1982, at A8, col. I; (2) voluntary censorship by American scientists, 
see Washington Post, Jan. 9, 1982, at A5, col. I; and (3) increased cooperation between the U.S. 
government and major research centers and universities, see Keeping High-Tech Secrets, Newsweek, 
Jan. 25, 1982, at 34. 
6. Among the issues under critical examination is whether technology restrictions impinge on 
Constitutional freedoms. Restrictions on the export of American technology involve a far greater 
intervention by the Government in private enterprise than do restrictions upon the export of other 
commodities, particularly in the operations of business and scientific research. See Berman & Garson, 
U.S. Export Controls -Past, Present and Future, 67 OlLUM. L. REV. 791, 824 (1967) [hereinafter cited as 
Berman & Garson]; see also Olmment, The Export Administration Act of 1979: Latest Statutory Resolution of 
the "Right to Export" Versus National Security and Foreign Policy Controls, 19 COLUM. J. TRANsNAT'L L. 255, 
279-80 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Right to Export]; Note, An Overview of Export Controls on Transfer of 
Technology to the U.S.S.R. in Light of Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan, 5 N.C. J. INT'L & COM. REG. 555, 
572-73 (Summ. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Soviet Intervention]; Recent Developments, Restrictions on the 
Export of Critical Technologies, 22 HARV. INT'L LJ. 411, 417-18 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Critical 
Technologies]; Recent Developments, Inrernational Trade: Export Restrictions - United States v. Edler 
Industries, Inc., 20 HARV. INT'L L.J. 201 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Recent Developments]; Case 
Comment, Arms Control-State Department Regulation of Exports of Technical Data Relating To Munitions Held 
to Encompass General Knowledge and Experience, United States v. Van Hee, 531 F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1976), 9 
Int'l J. L. & POL. 91, 104-05 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Van Hee Case Comment]. Thus, the national 
interest in preventing the development of certain types of foreign industry must be weighed against the 
national interest in preserving American industry from excessive interference, as well as against the 
national interest in preserving freedom of international communication. Berman & Garson, supra, at 
824. 
7. This Comment focuses on unilateral export controls. However, the United States is also engaged 
in multilateral export controls through the Coordinating Committee on Export Controls [hereinafter 
cited as COCOM]. COCOM is an informal, cooperative system of national security export controls. The 
United States and its NATO allies, except Iceland and Japan, established COCOM along with the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949. The purpose of COCOM is to harmonize national policies 
regarding the export of goods and technology which provide military potential to the Communist bloc. 
The controls apply to Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, the Soviet 
Union, and the Asian communist countries, except China. For a more detailed discussion of COCOM, 
see Soviet Intervention, supra note 6, at 562; see also NATO INFORMATION SERVICE, NATO HANDBOOK 5 
(1972). 
8. 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1976 & Supp. 1980). 
9. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (Supp. III 1979). 
10. Hulfbrauer & Carlson, United States Policy Toward the Transfer of Proprietary Technology: Licenses, 
Taxes, and Finance, 14 VAND. J. TRANsNAT'L L. 337, 339-40 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Hulfbrauer & 
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cusses the historical background of both Acts and the factors that led to their 
enactment. The author examines the definition of "technical data" in order to 
explain exactly what types of technology are subject to government control. The 
discussion of the definition of technical data includes an examination of the 
limited 11 case law in this area and an analysis of its effect on American business 
and individual freedom. The licensing procedures are then explored in order to 
determine the criteria by which the U.S. government denies or grants export 
licenses. 
Following this discussion, the author analyzes the implications of current 
regulations under both Acts on American business and Congressional attempts 
Carlson]. Hulfbrauer and Carlson have identified six legal mechanisms including legislation such as the 
AECA and the EAA, which affect the rate of technology transfer between the United States and foreign 
nations. Those mechanisms are: 
(I) export licensing controls on technology which are usually imposed for national security or foreign 
policy reasons. See discussion at notes 130-35 infra, and at notes 152-60 infra. The restricted technol-
ogy may have specific military application. See text accompanying notes 53-63 infra. Technology 
destined for the Soviet bloc and other hostile nations is subject to strict scrutiny. See text accompany-
ing notes 182-83 infra. 
(2) patent law; Statutory patent conditions provide incentives for foreign inventors to patent their 
inventions in the United States. Patent law also contains mechanisms to protect United States 
inventors against the use of pirated U.S. technology for the manufacture of goods abroad and their 
subsequent exportation to the United States market; 
(3) tax policy; Although international tax rules are not designed to encourage or discourage technol-
ogy transfers, deviations from tax neutrality between technology income earned abroad and technol-
ogy income earned in the United States may be important enough to significantly influence the rate of 
technology transfer; 
(4) financial policy; Various U.S. programs designed to provide official credits and guarantees for 
sales and investment abroad act to encourage the export of technology; 
(5) import policy; Tariffs, quotas, and administered protection may act to burden the production 
and export of high technology goods; and 
(6) U.S. antitrust law; Burdensome antitrust laws may lead American firms to decide between 
producing through controlled foreign corporations or not producing outside the United States at all. 
ld. 
II. The case law in this area is minimal because court challenges to export licensing decisions, for 
several reasons, are rare. First, the Export Administration Act of 1979 does not provide exporters with a 
right of action to challenge export licensing decisions. Instead, the EAA limits exporters to a cause of 
action to force compliance with the procedural guidelines of the Act. However, the Act requires the 
exporter to petition the Secretary of Commerce before initiating the court action. 50 U.S.C.A. app. 
§ 2409(j). If the Secretary of Commerce notifies the applicant that the license request requires additional 
time because of its "exceptional importance and complexity," 50 U.S.c. app. § 2409(£)(4), the Secretary 
can prevent the exporter from exercising his right to action. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2409(j)(2). Second, 
constitutional challenges to export licensing decisions raised in defense to criminal charges under the 
Export Administration Act are rare due to the infrequency of prosecutions. Some observers suggest 
that this infrequency is due to successful deterrence, or to the difficulties of establishing "knowing or 
willfull" violations and of obtaining jurisdiction over foreign parties. See Right to EXPCfft, supra note 6, at 
277 n. 141. Those seeking judicial review of licensing decisions under the Arms Export Control Act of 
1976 face similar impediments. The 1976 Act does not contain a provision for specific judicial review. 
Furthermore, through the invocation of the political question, void-for-vagueness and delegation 
doctrines, courts have been reluctant to delve into the national security and foreign policy bases of 
licensing decisions. See Right to Export, supra note 6, at 280. See generally United States v. Curtiss-Wright 
Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965); United States v. Brumage, 377 F. Supp. 
144 (E.D.N.Y. 1974). 
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to alleviate the burdens of export controls. Finally, the author concludes that 
because of the political nature of technology transfer decisions and the ever-
changing status of U.S. foreign policy interests, Congress wisely provides the 
executive branch with broad powers to control technology exports under the 
AECA of 1976 and the EAA of 1979. 
II. THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT OF 1976 
A. Backgrourul 
For a period of nearly twenty years, the Neutrality Acts of 193512 and 193913 
authorized the President to control the export of arms, ammunition or imple-
ments of war to any hostile country during a war between two or more foreign 
states. 14 A subsequent amendment to the 1935 Act l5 granted the President the 
power to restrict the "shipment of certain articles or materials in addition to 
arms, ammunition and implements of war"16 where such restrictions were "nec-
essary to promote the security or preserve the peace of the United States or to 
protect the lives of citizens of the United States."17 The 1939 Act maintained 
these presidential powers and granted the President the additional power to 
restrict the export of any articles or materials to any country involved in a 
declared state of war.18 However, the Neutrality Act of 1939 did not mention 
technology or technical data in any of its provisions regarding export controls. In 
addition, neither term was mentioned in the list of the arms, ammunitions and 
implements of war subject to export control pursuant to the Neutrality Act. 19 
In 1954, Congress repealed the munitions control section of the Neutrality Act 
for several reasons. 20 First, the Neutrality Act had become antiquated - its 
provisions did not enable the executive branch to respond quickly to changing 
technical, military and political situations. 21 For this reason, the State Depart-
12. Neutrality Act of August 31, 1935, ch. 837, 40 Stat. 1081 amended S.]. Res. 51, ch. 146, § 2(a), 50 
Stat. 122 (1937); superceded by Neutrality Act of Nov. 4, 1939, ch. 2, 54 Stat. 4 (1939). 
13. Neutrality Act of Nov. 4, 1939, ch. 2, 54 Stat. 4; see generally Berman & Garson, supra note 6, at 
791-92 n.1. 
14. Neutrality Act of August 31,1935, ch. 837,40 Stat. 1081. 
15. S.J. Res. 51, ch. 146, § 2(a), 50 Stat. 122 (1937), superceded by Neutrality Act of Nov. 4, 1939 
(ch. 2, 54 Stat. 4). 
16. [d. 
17. S.]. Res. 51, ch. 146, § 2(a), 50 Stat. 122 (1937); see generally Berman & Garson, supra, note 6, at 
791-92 n.1 for a detailed account of the history of U.S. export controls. 
18. Neutrality Act of Nov. 4, 1939, ch. 2, § 12, 54 Stat. 4, 10. 
19. See Proclamation No. 2237 of May 1, 1937, 22 U.S.c. § 245G)-II(i) (1937) and in 50 Stat. 1834. 
20. See generally H.R. Rep. No. 1925, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 90 (1954); S. Rep. No. 1799, 83d Cong., 2d 
Sess. 79, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 3175, 3245. 
21. See generally H.R. Rep. No. 1925, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 90 (1954); S. Rep. No. 1799, 83d Cong., 2d 
Sess. 79, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONGo & An. NEWS 3175, 3245. Legislators determined that the 
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ment claimed that the Neutrality Act did not provide for an effective program of 
arms control.22 Second, arms exporters were dissatisfied with the Neutrality Act 
due to the excessive paperwork required.23 The Neutrality Act did not permit 
the issuance of generallicenses24 and, therefore, required exporters of items of 
low military potential to go through the same extensive application process as 
exporters of articles of obvious military potential.25 Finally, the burdensome 
administrative aspects of the Neutrality Act necessitated a change in law. 26 
After Congress repealed Section 12 of the Neutrality Act, it placed the export 
of munitions and related technical data27 under presidential control by enacting 
Section 414 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954.28 Although Congress subjected 
"technical data" to export control, it did not define "technical data." Instead, 
Congress delegated the responsibility of defining technical data to the executive 
branch. Courts interpreting the Act29 and its accompanying regulations allowed 
the State Department considerable latitude in restricting exports of technology 
when munitions were involved.30 
executive branch was unable to respond quickly to changing conditions because § 12 of the Neutrality 
Act contained cumbersome administrative requirements. For example, § 12 established a National 
Munitions Control Board that soon became unnecessary. Section 12 also called for semiannual reports 
to Congress that proved to be unusually burdensome. /d. 
22. See Hearings on H.R. 6344 before a Sub-Committee of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 83d Cong., 
2d Sess. 4-6,11-13 (1954). See generally H.R. Rep. No. 1925, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 90 (1954); S. Rep. No. 
1799, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 79, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 3175, 3245. 
23. See Hearings on H.R. 6344 Before a Sub-Committee of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 83d Cong., 
2d Sess. 14-18,24 (1954); see generally 1954 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 3175,3245. 
24. A "general license" is a license of general applicability that permits the export of commodities 
which are peaceful in nature. 15 C.F.R. § 371.1 (1980). See text and accompanying notes 175-80 infra. 
25. See 1954 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 3175, 3245; see generally Hearings on H.R. 6344 Before a 
Sub-Committee of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 14-18,24 (1954). 
26. See 1954 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 3175, 3245. Subsection (h) of § 12 of the Neutrality Act 
required the National Munitions Control Board to submit semiannual reports to Congress. These 
reports were to include the name of the purchaser and the terms of the sale involved in each export 
license no matter how insignificant the shipment might be. These reports constituted an unnecessary 
administrative and financial burden of little interest to recipients of the report. Id. 
27. See H.R. Rep. No. 2637, § 414, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1954). House and Senate conferees 
acknowledged the apparent difficulties in regulating technical data, but emphasized the importance of 
such regulation to national security. Id. 
28. Mutual Security Act of 1954, ch. 937, Tit. IV, § 414, 68 Stat. 848 (1954), amended by 22 U.S.C. 
§ 1934 (1970). Section 414 provided in pertinent part: "The President is authorized to control, in 
furtherance of world peace and the security and foreign policy of the United States, the export ... of 
arms, ammunition, and implements of war, including technical data relating thereto." /d. 
29. Specifically, the courts considered the scope oftechnical data regulations in United States V. Edler 
Industries, Inc., 579 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1978), and in United States V. Van Hee, 531 F.2d 532 (6th Cir. 
1976). See text accompanying notes 80-112 and 65-79 infra. 
30. United States v. Edler Industries, Inc., 579 F.2d 516; United States V. Van Hee, 531 F.2d 352. 
The State Department's definition of technical data at the time of the Edler and Van Hee decisions was 
essentially the same as the definition in effecttoday. Compare 22 C.F.R. § 125 (1975) with 22 C.F.R. § 125 
(1981). For detailed background on the Mutual Security Act of 1954, see Van Hee Case Comment, supra 
note 6, at 96-98. 
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B. Provisions 
The Arms Export Control Act of 197631 replaced the Mutual Security Act of 
1954.32 The AECA sets forth the current provisions governing exports of muni-
tions and related technology.33 Again, Congress has not defined "technology" 
under the AECA. Instead, Congress has delegated the responsibility of defining 
"technical data" to the executive branch by authorizing the President to desig-
nate those items which shall be subject to export controls.34 
The Arms Export Control Act of 1976 advances three broadly-worded policy 
objectives: 35 (1) to encourage regionaP6 arms control and disarmament agree-
ments and to discourage arms races; (2) to facilitate the common defense by 
entering into international arrangements with friendly countries;37 and (3) to 
encourage the world community to reduce international trade in weapons.38 
Pursuant to these policy objectives, Congress, within the AECA itself, urged the 
President to initiate multilateral discussions with foreign nations and restrict the 
total dollar value of foreign military and commercial sales so that such value 
would not exceed current levels. 39 Under the AECA and its accompanying 
regulations,40 technology can be transferred from the United States as part of a 
foreign military sale41 or as a commercial sale pursuant to a commercial export 
licenseY Therefore, any effort by the executive branch to carry out the Con-
gressional objective to limit the dollar value of foreign military and commercial 
sales is likely to reduce the flow of technology transfers from the United States. 
Foreign military sales and commercial sales are distinct types of exports. First, 
technology may leave the country as part of a "foreign military sale" (FMS).43 This 
31. 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1976 & Supp. 1980). 
32. Ch. 937, Tit. IV, § 414, 68 Stat. 848 (1954), amended by 22 U.S.C. § 1934 (1970). The reason for 
the replacement was to authorize appropriations for military assistance. See H.R. 1144, 94th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 1378-81. 
33. 22 U.S.C.A. § 2778. 
34. 22 u.s.C. § 2778(a). See text and accompanying notes 54-56 infra. 
35. 22 U.S.C. § 2751 (1976 & Supp. 1980). 
36. The United States is involved in "regional" arms control through its participation as a member of 
the Coordinating Committee on Export Controls (COCOM). See note 7 supra. 
37. See note 7 supra. 
38. 22 U.S.C. § 2751. 
39. /d. 
40. 22 C.F.R. § 125. 
41. 22 U.S.C. § 2751 authorizes the sale of data and research to friendly countries as part of 
cooperative programs of mutual concern. Sections 2752-2778 refer only to the sales of defense articles 
and defense services by the United States Government, but the provisions are unavoidably applicable to 
the technology associated with such articles and services. See 22 C.F.R. § 125.01 and notes 49-63 and 
accompanying text infra. See generally Hulfbrauer & Carlson, supra note 10, at 347. 
42. 22 u.s.C. § 2778; 22 C.F.R. § 125. 
43. 22 U.S.C. § 2762 (1976 & Supp. 1980). The controversial sale in 1981 of five highly sophisticated 
Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft to Saudi Arabia is a prime example of a 
foreign military sale (FMS). The Boeing Corporation developed and constructed the jets; Westinghouse 
Corporation developed the early warning radar system housed in the jets. The AWACS were part of a 
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is a government-to-government sale. In such a sale, the U.S. government pur-
chases military hardware and related technology from private business and, in 
turn, sells them to a foreign nation.44 Second, technology may leave the country 
under the AECA via a "commercial sale."45 The two types of sales are different 
in that commercial sales are made directly between a private contractor and a 
foreign country; thus, the sale does not go through the government-to-
government channels. The FMS rules46 do not apply to commercial sales; a 
separate set of provisions governs commercial salesY Although not a party to 
the transaction, the U.S. government is a significant participant in the commer-
cial sale since a U.S. contractor must obtain an export license before concluding a 
commercial sale. 48 An examination of FMS sales is beyond the scope of this 
Comment since this author's purpose is to examine the export licensing proce-
dure, the definition of "technical data" for licensing purposes, and the effects of 
export licensing decisions on American business and individuals. 49 
C. Definition of Technical Data Under the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 
The Arms Export Control Act of 197650 authorizes the President to control 
the commercial export of defense articles and defense services. 51 The President 
exercises this control through the Office of Munitions Control of the U.S. State 
Department. 52 The Department of State designates those items which it consid-
ers to be defense articles and defense services, and therefore subject to export 
control, in the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (IT AR). 53 The items 
$8.5 billion arms sale to Saudi Arabia. President Reagan formally proposed the sale before the Congress 
on October 2, 1981. Congress could have blocked the sale had it adopted a concurrent resolution to that 
effect. See 22 V.S.C. § 2776(b)(l) (1980). 
44. 22 V.S.C.A. § 2762. 
45. See 22 V.S.C.A. § 2778; see generally Sherler,Janik, & Green, Foreign Military Sales: A Guide to U.S. 
Bureaucracy, 13 J. 1NT'L L. & Ec. 545 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Sherler]. 
46. 22 V.S.C.A. §§ 2751-2777 govern foreign military sales. 
47. 22 V.S.C.A. § 2778 governs commercial sales. Congress has imposed an important limitation on 
commercial sales. Any sale of major defense equipment valued at $35 million or more must go through 
FMS channels. See text accompanying notes 222-27 infra. 
48. 22 V.S.C.A. § 2778; see generally Sherler, sufrra note 45, at 545. 
49. For a more thorough look at foreign military sales, see Sherler, supra note 45, at 545; V.S. DEP'T 
OF STATE, ANNUAL REpORT ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND EXPORTS, FISCAL YEAR 1980. In fiscal year 
1980, the aggregate value of commercial sales of defense articles and services by license was 
$1,968,342,765. In the same year, the aggregate value of foreign military sales was $1,178, 123,934.ld. 
at VI. 
50. 22 V.S.C. § 2778. 
51. ld. "Defense articles and defense services" mean those items designated by the President as such. 
22 V.S.C. § 2794(7); see text accompanying notes 52-54 infra. 
52. In practice, the Office of Munitions Control has primary responsibility for administering the V.S. 
government program to control commercial exports of defense articles and services. See V.S. DEP'T OF 
STATE, OFFICE OF MUNITIONS CONTROL-PRINCIPAL FUNCTIONS (March 3, 1980) (available by writing to 
the Director, Office of Munitions Control, Vnited States Dep't of State, Washington, D.C. 20520) 
[hereinafter cited as MUNITIONS CONTROL]; see 22 C.F.R. § 121. 
53. 22 V.S.C. § 2778; 22 C.F.R. §§ 121-128, 130. The ITARincludes: (I) the Munitions List, see text 
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designated as defense articles and services III the IT AR comprise the U.S. 
Munitions List. 54 
Included on the Munitions List is "technical data" relating to: (1) any article 
containing information which is classified as requiring protection in the interests 
of national defense; and (2) the articles designated on the Munitions List as arms, 
ammunition and implements of war.55 For the purpose of the Arms Export 
Control Act, the IT AR defines "technical data" in three categories. First, "techni-
cal data" means any unclassified56 information that "can be used, or be adopted 
for use, in the design, production, manufacture, repair, overhaul, processing, 
engineering, development, operation, maintenance, or reconstruction of arms, 
ammunition, and implements of war on the United States Munitions List."57 
Second, "technical data" is any technology which advances the state-of-the-art58 
or establishes a new art in an area of significant military applicability59 in the 
United States. 60 Third, the definition of "technical data" includes "classified 
information."61 Thus, restrictions on technical data under the Arms Export 
Control Act are primarily a function of the United States Munitions List. The 
regulations under the AECA allow the President to control the export62 of any 
accompanying note 54 infra; (2) procedures for obtaining export licenses; (3) procedures for enforcing 
provisions of the Arms Export Control Act or the IT AR; and (4) disclosure rules on agents' fees and 
political contributions. 22 C.F.R. § 121-28, 130. 
54. 22 C.F.R. § 121.01. The Munitions List can also be found at 15 C.F.R. § 370 (1980). The 
Department of State sometimes consults with the Departments of Defense and Commerce to determine 
whether a particular item should be placed on the Munitions List or the Commodities Control List 
which is governed by the Department of Commerce. See text accompanying notes 182-84 infra. 
55. 22 C.F.R. § 121.01 (Categories XVII and XVIII). 
56. "Unclassified information" is any information that is not classified. For definition of "classified 
information," see note 61 infra. 
57. 22 C.F.R. § 125.01. 
58. The regulations do not define the term "state-of-the-art." 
59. The term "significant military applicability" is not defined in the regulations. The fact that the 
State Department does not define such term may create uncertainty for exporters. Exporters may be 
unsure of what the "state-of-the-art" is, and in doubt as to what areas constitute "areas of significant 
military applicability." The regulations provide that the initial burden of determining whether or not 
the technology in question advances the state-of-the-art or establishes a new art is upon the license 
applicant. 22 C.F.R. § 125.01 n.1. 
60. 22 C.F.R. § 125.0 I. 
61. 22 C.F.R. § 125.02. The term "classified information" refers to either equipment or information 
which the State Department has assigned a U.S. security classification because such equipment or 
information requires protection in the interest of national security. Critics of export controls more 
readily accept the validity of controls on the latter two types of "technical data," i.e., technology 
advancing the state-of-the-art and classified information. See Van Hee Case Comment, supra note 6, at 
105 n.67. 
62. The regulations define "export" as "the sending or taking out of the United States in any manner, 
any article, equipment, or technical data on the U.S. Munitions List except as may be otherwise 
expressly provided in a particular context." 22 C.F.R. § 121.19. Thus, with regard to technical data, 
exporting occurs whenever an exporter transfers information by oral, visual or documentary means. An 
export occurs, for instance, whenever a person mails or ships technical data outside the United States, 
discloses technical data through visits abroad by American citizens and discloses technical data to 
foreign nationals in the United States. 22 C.F.R. § 125.03. 
1983] THE REGULATION OF TECHNICAL DATA 177 
unclassified or classified information relating to articles63 on the Munitions List. 
The courts have interpreted munitions control regulations broadly.64 The 
Sixth Circuit, in United States v. Van Hee,65 was the first appellate court to 
interpret the scope of "technical data" as defined in State Department regula-
tions.66 The United States prosecuted the defendants in Van Hee for conspiring 
to export from the United States to Portugal certain technical data relating to the 
Commando V-lOO, a military armored amphibious vehicle, without obtaining an 
export license67 from the State Department. Because the U.S. Munitions List 
includes amphibious military vehicles, such vehicles cannot be exported without 
a license. 68 Van Hee, a defendant in the case, originally obtained the required 
export license. However, after the Portuguese government refused to certify 
that the vehicles would not be reexported,69 the Director of Munitions ControFO 
revoked the license. 71 
63. "Article." under the regulations. means "any of the arms, ammunition, and implements of war 
and technical data relating thereto enumerated on the Munitions List." 22 C.F.R. § 121.01. 
64. United States v. Edler Industries, Inc., 579 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Van Hee, 
531 F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1976). 
65. 531 F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1976). 
66. At the time of U.S. v. Van Hee, the provisions of 22 C. F. R. § 125.0 I (1966) were in effect. Those 
regulations were equivalent in substance to those regulations in effect today. Also, at the time of U.S. v. 
Van Hee, The Mutual Security Act of 1954 - the predecessor of the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 
- was in effect. The 1954 Act provided in pertinent part: 
(a) the President is authorized to control in furtherance of world peace and the security and 
foreign policy of the United States, the export ... of arms, ammunition, and implements of 
war, including technical data relating thereto .... The President is authorized to designate 
those articles which shall be considered as arms, ammunition and implements of war, including 
technical data relating thereto, for the purposes of this section. 
22 U.S.C. § 1934 (1970). 
67. For a detailed discussion of the licensing procedure under the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, 
see text accompanying notes 113-133 infra. 
68. 22 C.F.R. § 121.01. The term "amphibious vehicles" means "automotive vehicles or chassis 
embodying all-wheel drive and equipped to meet special military requirements, with adaptation fea-
tures for deep water fording and sealed electrical systems." 22 C.F.R. § 121.08. Examples of other 
vehicles which cannot be exported without a license are armed and armoured vehicles, railway trains, 
tanks, gun carriers, self-propelled guns and trailers. 22 C.F.R. § 121.01 (Category VII). 
69. The State Department requires such certification in order to assure that exports will remain in 
the country designated on the export license. The State Department designed the certification require-
ment to prevent exporters and foreign countries from undermining the export control process; the 
State Department does not allow other countries to reexport United States munitions to a destination 
that would not receive State Department approval in an original license request. Further, a designated 
country may not divert exported equipment beyond its boundaries even though the equipment might 
have been incorporated through an intermediate process into other end items. 22 C.F.R. § 123.10. The 
State Department does not require an end-use certificate for every export of a munitions article. /d. The 
Department required a certificate in the Van Hee transaction because the State Department feared that 
Portugal would reexport the Commando V-IOOs and use them in one of its African Colonies. See Van 
Hee Case Comment, supra note 6, at 92 citing Brief for Appellant at 14; United States v. Van Hee, 531 
F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1976). 
70. The Director of Munitions Control is the State Department official who heads the Office of 
Munitions Control, which has primary responsibility for regulating arms export. See text accompanying 
notes 113-14 infra. 
71. Van Hee, 531 F.2d at 354; Regarding the Director's authority to revoke an export license, see text 
accompanying notes 120-25 infra. 
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After the license revocation, Van Hee took a group of technicians familiar with 
the development of the Commando V-IOO to Portugal with the intent to con-
struct a vehicle similar to the Commando V _100. 72 Besides possessing their own 
expertise, the group had in its possession photocopies of blueprints of the 
essential components of the Commando V-IOO.73 In Portugal, defendant Van 
Hee and his group of technicians began to construct a model of the vehicle. 74 
They abandoned this project, however, when a prototype of the amphibious 
vehicle arrived from West Germany.75 The prototype's arrival was the result of 
an arrangement by Van Hee for the sale of a demonstration vehicle by West 
Germany to a Spanish intermediary, who then resold it to Portugal.76 By remov-
ing and studying parts of the prototype, and using the Commando V-IOO 
blueprints to procure components, the group began constructing a vehicle simi-
lar to the American V -100. 77 
The regulations in effect at the time of Van Hee's activities in Portugal defined 
"technical data" as any information "which would enable the recipient to use, 
produce, and/or operate" an article on the Munitions List. 78 The court inter-
preted this definition to include as "technical data" not only the Commando 
V-IOO blueprints, but also the group members' general knowledge, technical 
expertise and know-how used in the process of constructing the vehicle in 
Portugal.79 Consequently, the court of appeals affirmed Van Hee's conviction. 
The Sixth Circuit's holding, namely that "technical data" encompasses an 
individual's general knowledge and expertise, was narrowed to some extent, 
although not significantly, by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Edler.80 The 
United States charged Edler Industries with exporting, without a license, techni-
cal data relating to articles on the U.S. Munitions List.8! Edler Industries, a U.S. 
aerospace company, had developed expertise in producing special tape-
wrappings and materials called "carbon/carbon" composites.82 The materials 




76. See Van Hee Case Comment, supra note 6, at 93 n.B. 
77. Van Hee, 531 F.2d at 354. 
78. 22 C.F.R. § 125.01 (1966). The definition of "technical data" in 22 C.F.R. § 125.01 (1966) is 
substantially similar to the definition of "technical data" in the IT AR. Because no significant difference 
exists between the two definitions, the State Department views the judicial interpretations of "technical 
data" under the Mutual Security Act of 1954 as applying with equal force to the definition of "technical 
data" under the AECA. Telephone interview with State Department officials, Office of Munitions 
Control, United States Department of State (October 19BI and February 19B2). The author has relied 
on information acquired by telephone interview because the State Department fails to publish much 
information about its export control decisions. The officials who provided the information discussed in 
this Comment asked not to be identified. 
79. Van Hee, 531 F.2d at 357. 
BO. United States v. Edler Indus., Inc., 579 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 197B). For a thorough discussion of 
Edler, see Recent Developments, supra note 6. 
B!. Edler, 579 F.2d at 51B. 
B2. Ed. 
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were suitable for use in several missile projects for the U.S. government. How-
ever, the U.S. government did not consider the techniques Edler used to pro-
duce these materials as classified information, and the technology had various 
civilian applications. 83 
French missile companies contacted Edler in 1968 and 1974 requesting an 
agreement with Edler whereby the American company would provide the 
French companies with technical assistance and data related to a tape-wrapping 
program.84 Edler applied for an export license from the U.S. State Depart-
ment. 85 The State Department denied the license request on the basis that "the 
exportation of this particular technical knowledge contravened United States 
policy";86 such policy being that the export of Edler's expertise would be detri-
mental to U.S. national security interests. Despite the license denial, Edler 
provided the French missile companies with the technology they desired.87 As a 
result of this technical assistance, the U.S. government brought criminal charges 
against Edler for exporting technical data without a license,88 and Edler was 
convicted.89 
On appeal from the district court decision, Edler based its challenge on the 
first amendment.9o Edler claimed that the Mutual Security Act of 195491 was 
unconstitutional because it restricted Edler's first amendment right to engage 
freely in international communication. 92 Edler argued that the burden of obtain-
ing governmental approval prior to any export of technical data operates as a 
prior restraint on the exercise of first amendment rights.93 In addition, Edler 
argued that the statute's operation as a prior restraint would unduly restrict the 
development of international research and development.94 
The court responded to Edler's challenges by examining first amendment 
rights in the commercial context. 95 The court noted that the boundaries of the 
commercial speech doctrine remained unclearly defined96 despite recent Su-




87. Id. at 519. 
8B. Id. at 518. 
89. [d.; Edler was convicted for violating the Mutual Security Act of 1954, ch. II, § 414, 68 Stat. 848, 
amended by 22 U.S.C. § 1934 (1976), repealed by the current provision, 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1980). The two 
Sections are substantially the same, and the Edler holding is applicable to the AECA. See note 78 supra. 
90. Edler also raised a fifth amendment procedural due process claim. The court rejected the claim 
summarily in a footnote to the opinion. Edler, 579 F.2d at 522 n.2. The court found that the denial of 
Edler's license application was not arbitrary since it was founded on a policy of keeping missile 
technology in the United States. Moreover, the court found that Edler had failed to exhaust its 
administrative remedies as provided for in the regulations. See id. 
91. Edler challenged 22 U.S.C. § 1934 (1970) (repealed 1976) which was substantially the same as the 
current law, i.e. § 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1980). 
92. Edler, 579 F.2d at 519. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. For a thorough discussion of the first amendment issues, see id. 
95. Edler, 579 F.2d at 519-20. 
96. Edler, 579 F.2d at 520. 
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preme Court decisions which extended first amendment protection to at least 
some commercial communications. 97 The court stated that Edler had raised a 
plausible claim that "the First Amendment furnishes a degree of protection for 
its dissemination of technological information,"98 but the court did not define 
the scope of that protection. Rather, the court used a balancing test in which it 
weighed the infringements of first amendment rights against the legitimacy of 
the government objectives involvedY9 In this particular case, the court found 
that the governmental objective involved related to government efforts at con-
trolling the international arms race. The court stated that the U.S. government 
"undeniably possesses the power to regulate the international arms traffic."loo 
The court acknowledged that, in order to effectively regulate international arms 
traffic, the government has to regulate some technical data relating to military 
hardware. lol Without such regulation, arms control would be of "negligible" 
practical value. I02 
In an attempt to adhere to the purpose of the Act while avoiding serious 
interference with the international interchange of scientific and technological 
information,103 the court established a two-part test that must be satisfied before 
the State Department can restrict technical data under the Arms Export Control 
Act. lo4 First, technical data must be significantly related to an item on the 
Munitions List. lo5 The court did not define what establishes a "significant rela-
tionship" between technical data and an article on the Munitions List. However, 
the court stated that any technical data which assists in the foreign manufacture 
of articles that, if manufactured in the United States, would be on the Munitions 
list, meets the significant relationship test. I06 The second part of the Edler test 
97. The court cited such cases as Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (first amendment 
protects attorney advertising); Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Council, 425 U.S. 
748 (1976) (first amendment protection afforded advertisement of prescription drug sales); Bigelow v. 
Virginia. 42 i U.S. 809 (1975) (first amendment protects advertising of activities even if they are 
regulated by the state). 
98. Edler. 579 F.2d at 520. 
99. [d. the court said in part: "Recognition that Edler may have constitutionally protected expression 
does not by itself define the extent of that protection. By regulating conduct. the Government may 
pursue its legitimate objectives even though incidental limitations upon expression may result." [d.; see 
generally Konigsburg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 50-51 (1961). 




104. !d. Although the court referred to 22 u.s.c. § 1934 at the time of its decision. its two-pronged 
test is equally applicable to 22 U.S.c. § 2778 (1980) due to the substantial similarity between the two 
statutes. The State Department adheres to the Edler two-pronged test. Telephone interview with 
Assistant Director of Office of Munitions Control. United States Department of State (Oct. 1981). 
105. Edler, 579 F.2d at 521. The court did not define what it would require to establish a "significant 
relationship." In practice, this determination is made on a case-by-case basis by the Office of Munitions 
Control. See text accompanying notes 112-14 infra. 
106. Edler. 579 F.2d at 521. 
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requires that the relationship of the technical data to an article on the Munitions 
List be so clear that the exporter could be said to have adequate notice that the 
foreign recipient of the information intends to use it to produce or operate 
articles on the Munitions List. 107 The court concluded that the fact that technol-
ogy has a non-military use may have some bearing on whether a defendant 
exporter had adequate notice. lOB In particular, the fact that technology has a 
nonmilitary use supports an exporter's claim that he did not have notice of the 
recipient's intent to put the information to military use. Because the district court 
had not allowed Edler to develop the defense of lack of notice of military 
applicability of the "carbon/carbon" composites, the court of appeals reversed 
the conviction and remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial. l09 
By not defining what constitutes a "significant relationship," the Edler court 
allowed the executive branch broad discretion in the area of technological export 
controlsYo In practice, the determination of what constitutes a significant rela-
tionship is made on a case-by-case basis by the Office of Munitions Control of the 
U.S. State Department. 111 The State Department has construed the "significant 
relationship" test to require only a reasonable connection between a given 
technology and an item of military hardware. If the State Department finds such 
a connection, it may subject the technology to licensing controls. 112 
D. Licensing Procedures Under the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 
The U.S. State Department has promulgated specific licensing procedures in 
an attempt to effectively control the exports of munitions and related technol-
ogy.113 Any person engaged in the business of manufacturing or exporting items 
on the Munitions List must register with the Office of Munitions Control of the 
State Department. 114 In addition to registering, a person must submit an applica-
107. Id. A problem posed by this "adequate notice" reqirement is the fact that some technology which 
is exported solely for civilian purposes can easily be adopted for military use at a future date. The court 
of appeals did not state whether knowledge of potential future military application would constitute 
notice to the exporter. See Recent Developments, supra note 6, at 205. 
108. Edler, 579 F.2d at 522. 
109. !d. The court of appeals specifically stated that the district court should have allowed Edler to 
admit evidence that the information furnished by Edler had a number of non-military uses. The court 
stated that "evidence concerning nonmilitary applications is relevant to the question of scienter, i.e. 
whether a defendant knew or should have known that the recipient of the exported information would 
use the information to produce or operate Munitions List articles." Edler, 579 F.2d at 522. 
110. Telephone interview with State Department official, Office of Munitions Control, United States 
Department of State (February 1982); see also Recent Developments, International Trade: Export Restric-
tions-United SfJJtes v. Edler Indus., Inc., 579 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1979), 20 HARV. INT'L L.J. 20 1,205 (1979). 
Ill. Telephone interview with State Department official, Office of Munitions Control, United States 
Department of State (February 1982). 
112. Id. 
113. 22 C.F.R. § 121. See note 53 supra for discussion of State Department's authority to promulgate 
regulations. For a detailed description of licensing procedures under the ITAR, see Sherzer, supra note 
45, at 581. 
114. 22 C.F.R § 122.01(a). 
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tion to the Office of Munitions Control to receive export authorization whenever 
that person intends to commercially export an article on the Munitions List or 
technical data related to such an article. lIS An exporter must apply for export 
authorization even if exporting the article or technical data temporarily.116 The 
ITAR also requires export authorization whenever an exporter intends to receive 
a munitions article or related technical data which is in transit to a third coun-
try.ll7 Similarly, an exporter must apply for authorization whenever intending to 
use technical data to describe a Munitions List article to a foreign person."B 
Finally, the IT AR requires an exporter to apply for authorization before export-
ing technical data related to a manufacturing license (i.e., an agreement whereby 
an American person grants a foreign person a legal right or license to manufac-
ture abroad) or a technical assistance agreement (i.e., an agreement whereby an 
American person performs functions or conveys information involving the dis-
closure of technical data).119 
Upon receipt of an application or upon review oflicenses already granted, the 
State Department may deny, revoke, suspend or amend the export license 
without prior notice whenever the department believes such action would fur-
ther "world peace," the "security of the United States" or the "foreign policy of 
the United States."120 Additionally, the State Department may take such action 
whenever it believes that the applicant has violated the Arms Export Control Act 
or its accompanying regulations, 121 or whenever the department has debarredl22 
or suspendedl23 the applicant. These provisions of the IT AR govern applica-
tions and licenses for the export of technical data as well as for the export of 
articles on the Munitions list.124 
In making its determination of whether a license should be granted, denied, 
suspended or revoked, the Office of Munitions Control (OMC) considers many 
factors. Initially, the OMC examines whether the article proposed for export is 
on the Munitions List. 125 If the proposed export is technical data, the OMC 
determines whether the data is related to an item on the Munitions List. 126 The 
115. 22 C.F.R §§ 123, 125. 
116. 22 C.F.R. § 123. 
117. [d. 
118. 22 C.F.R. § 125. 
119. 22 C.F.R § 124. 
1.20. 22 C.F.R § 123.05. 
121. [d. 
122. 22 C.F.R § 127.07 lists the reasons for which a person may be debarred (prohibited) from 
receiving an export license. The reasons include: conviction of a criminal offense; the violation of 22 
U.S.C. § 2778 or any of its accompanying rules and regulations; and decisions by the Office of Export 
Administration to deny, suspend or revoke export privileges of the applicant. 22 C.F.R § 127.07. 
123. 22 C.F.R § 123.05. 
124. 22 C.F.R. § 123.05 n.2. 
125. MUNITIONS CONTROL, supra note 52. 
126. [d. See text accompanying note 113 supra. 
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OMC then determines whether the applicant has met all IT AR requirements. 127 
Once the applicant has met all IT AR requirements, the OMC examines whether 
the application should be reviewed by other offices in the State Department. 
The OMC makes many licensing decisions within hours of receipt of the 
application. 128 Other requests, depending on destination, quantities and the 
significance of the Munitions List articles involved, may take longer. The OMC 
may conduct a more extensive review of particular applications in concert with 
other offices and agencies in order to assure that the granting of a license would 
in fact further "world peace and the security and foreign policy of the United 
States."129 In matters of national security or in matters requiring technical 
expertise, the OMC may solicit the views of various bureaus within the State 
Department or from other executive departments. 13o If unable to reconcile 
conflicting views on a given license application, the OMC refers the matter to the 
highest authority in the executive branch necessary to make the decision. 131 
The OMC does not rely on any single factor for the issuance or denial of a 
commercial export license. Rather, OMC bases its decisions on a number of 
criteria, including: the Arms Export Control Act; the IT AR; U.S. government 
policies originating with the President; 132 U.S. foreign, political and economic 
127. [d. The requirements referred to in the text are primarily related to ITAR registration and 
licensing procedures. 
128. [d. But cf statements of GAO International Division Director Frank C. Conahan, U.S. Export 
Weekly (BNA), No. 356, A-3 (May 5, 1981) (the system is a paper process that burdens exporters). 
129. 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1980). See MUNITIONS CONTROL, supra note 52, at 3. 
130. See MUNITIONS CONTROL, supra note 52, at 3. 
131. /d. 
132. For example, on July 8, 1981, President Reagan signed a directive on U.S. Arms Transfer Policy 
which provides guidelines for U.S. licensing decisions. The text of the directive provides in part: 
The United States ... views the transfer of conventional arms and other defense articles and 
services as an essential element of its global defense posture and an indispensable component 
of its foreign policy .... The United States will evaluate requests primarily in terms oftheir net 
contribution to enhanced deterrence and defense. It will accord high priority to requests from 
its major alliance partners and to those nations with whom it has friendly and cooperative 
security relationships. In making arms transfer decisions the United States will give due 
consideration to a broad range of factors including: 
- the degree to which the transfer responds appropriately to the military threats confronting 
the recipient; 
- whether the transfer will enhance the recipient's capability to participate in collective 
security efforts with the United States; 
- whether the transfer will promote mutual interests in countering externally supported 
aggression; 
- whether the transfer is consistent with United States interests in maintaining stability within 
regions where friends of the United States may have differing objectives; 
- whether the transfer is compatible with the needs of United States forces, recognizing that 
occasions will arise when other nations may require scarce items on an emergency basis; 
- whether the proposed equipment transfer can be absorbed by the recipient without over-
burdening its military support system or financial resources; and 
- whether any detrimental effects of the transfer are more than counterbalanced by positive 
contributions to United States interests and objectives .... 
All requests will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Those for coproduction, or the transfer 
of sensitive or advanced technology, will receive special scrutiny, taking into account economic 
and industrial factors for both the United States and other participating countries, the impor-
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policies; national security policies; OMC precedents; and whether a particular 
export is in the overall interest of the United States. 133 
III. THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT OF 1979 
A. Backgrourul 
The Arms Export Control Act of 1976 is only one means by which the U.S. 
government maintains control over the commercial export of goods and techni-
cal data. 134 The Export Administration Act of 1979135 provides the President 
with authority to implement export controls on goods, services and technical 
data. The Export Administration Act of 1979 and its three types of controls 136 
evolved from the Export Control Act of 1949137 and the Export Administration 
Act of 1969. 138 The changes in the degree of export control evidenced by each of 
tance of arms cooperation with NATO and other close friends and allies, potential third party 
transfers, and protection of sensitive technology and military capabilities. 
17 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 749 (1981). 
133. See MUNITIONS CONTROL, supra note 52, at 2. 
134. Other departments of the executive branch retain jurisdiction over the export of certain 
commodities. For example, the Department of Commerce has licensing jurisdiction over all commod-
ities and unclassified technical data exported from the United States except certain specialized items 
handled by other government agencies. See text accompanying note 157 infra. Defense articles, services, 
and technical data related thereto are licensed by the Office of Munitions Control, U.S. Department of 
State. See text accompanying notes 115-35 supra. Exports of nuclear equipment, facilities, and materials 
are licensed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Re-exports of nuclear equipment and 
materials are licensed by the Department of Energy. Narcotics and dangerous drugs are licensed by the 
U.S. Department of Justice. Natural gas and electric energy are licensed by the U.S. Department of 
Energy. Endangered species of fish and wildlife are licensed by the U.S. Department of Interior. See 15 
C.F.R. § 370.10. 
135. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420. 
136. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A SUMMARY OF U.S. EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS (Oct. 
1981) (available by writing to the U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Office of Export Administration, Washing-
ton, D.C. 20520). The U.S. Department of Commerce has described the applicability of these three 
types of controls as follows: 
(I) National security controls are instituted to provide control of exports making a significant 
contribution to the military potential of countries to the detriment of the United States, such as 
strategic commodities and technical data to the USSR, other Warsaw Pact countries, Laos, and 
the People's Republic of China. 
(2) Foreign policy controls are instituted to further significantly United States foreign policy 
or fulfill its declared international obligations, such as restrictions on exports to the Republic of 
South Africa, and Namibia, which are maintained in part to further U.S. policy and in part to 
support United Nations Security Council Resolutions. Controls may be in effect for both 
security and foreign policy reasons, such as controls on North Korea, Vietnam, Kampuchea, 
and Cuba. 
(3) Short supply controls are used to protect the domestic economy from excessive drain of 
scarce materials and to reduce inflation induced by export demand. 
Id. at I. 
137. Pub. L. No. 81-11, 63 Stat. 7 (1949) (expired 1969). The Act of 1949 was extended in 1953, 
1956, 1958, 1960 and 1962. See Berman & Garson,supra note 6, at 792, 799; Note,An Overvieu of Export 
Controls on Transfers of Technology to the U.S.S.R. in Light of Afghanistan, 5 N.C. J. INT'L and COM. REG. 555, 
563 (Summer 1980). 
138. Pub. L. No. 91-184, 83 Stat. 841 (1969). 
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these statutes reflect the changing political relationship between the United 
States and the Communist world. 139 
The Export Control Act of 1949 was the first legislation designed specifically 
to regulate non-military exports. 140 The 1949 Act was primarily an outgrowth of 
American concern over Soviet domination in Eastern Europe.141 This concern 
prompted the U.S. government to take measures to protect national security. 
Specifically, the U.S. government used this concern for national security as its 
basis for licensing controls on exports to the Soviet Union and the countries of 
Eastern Europe. 142 The national security rationale became more compelling as 
the "Cold War" consciousness took hold of Congress. 143 American involvement 
in the Korean conflict provided additional justification for restricting U.S. ex-
ports to Communist nations. National security required closer scrutiny of ex-
ports to North Korea's communist allies and led to a complete embargo on 
exports to North Korea and the People's Republic of China. 144 In general, the 
United States prohibited any exports which would assist the Communist nations 
militarily or economically.145 
By the late 1960's, as the national security rationale for strict trade prohibitions 
on exports to the European communist nations became less compelling,t46 the 
United States implemented fewer controls on trade with Eastern Europe. 147 
Congress enacted the Export Administration Act of 1969 to encourage this trend 
toward more liberal export controls. 148 The Export Administration Act of 1969 
narrowed the broad controls mandated by the 1949 Act. 149 Specifically, the 1969 
139. Comment, The ElCfJort Administration Act if 1979: Refining United States ElCfJort Control Machinery, 4 
B.C. INT'L & COMPo L. REv. 77,83 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Export Machinery]. 
140. For a detailed account of the development of U.S. export controls, see Berman & Garson, supra 
note 6, at 791; Abbot,Linking Trade to Political Goals, 65 MINN. L. REv. 739 (1981) [hereinafter cited as 
Abbot]. 
141. See Berman & Garson, supra note 6, at 796. 
142. [d. By 1948, Congress and the Truman Administration were alarmed by Soviet activities. After 
the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, the Department of Commerce placed most exports to the 
Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe under licensing control. In December 1948, a Senate 
Committee investigating U.S. export regulations reported that "the national security aspects of our 
export control program are of transcendent importance, particularly in view of the present activities of 
the Soviet Union and its satellites." See S. Rep. No. 1775, pt. 2, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1948). See also, 
Berman & Garson, supra note 6, at 796. 
143. Berman & Garson, supra note 6, at 795. 
144. Abbot, supra note 140, at 757. See also Berman & Garson, supra note 6, at 795. 
145. See Export Machinery, supra note 139, at 83. 
146. The national security rationale for strict trade prohibitions on exports to the European com-
munist nations became less compelling for several reasons. First, the Korean War, which had been a 
major reason for national security controls, had ended in 1953. Second, tension eased in Europe after 
the death of Stalin; Stalin's successors took on a more amicable posture toward the United States and 
Western Europe. Third, national security controls became less effective in light of the economic 
recovery of Western Europe. This fact spurred the increased use of foreign policy export controls. See 
Berman & Garson, supra note 6, at 799; Abbot, supra note 140, at 757. 
147. See Abbot, supra note 140, at 758. 
148. Pub. L. No. 91-184, 83 Stat. 841 (1969); see generally Abbot, supra note 140, at 758. 
149. See Abbot, supra note 140, at 758. See also ElCfJort Machinery, supra note 139, at 83-84. 
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Act banned for export to the communist states only goods of potential strategic 
value. ISO 
Congress continued this trend toward more liberal export controls by later 
substituting the Export Administration Act of 1979 for the 1969 ACt. 151 The 
EAA of 1979 authorizes the President to control exports of U.S. commodities 
and technical data to all foreign destinations whenever such controls are neces-
sary to achieve anyone of three purposes: to protect national security; to further 
foreign policy; or to prevent the excessive drain of materials in short supply.152 
The EAA of 1979 is an indication of a greater willingness on the part of 
Congress to expand East-West trade. 153 This willingness is evidenced by provi-
sions in the EAA which attempt to limit presidential authority to control ex-
ports. 154 
The EAA of 1979 is also a Congressional attempt to comprehensively set forth 
U.S. foreign policy legislation. Prior to the enactment of the EAA of 1979, 
Congress enacted piecemeal foreign policy export control legislation throughout 
the seventies. First, in 1974, shortly after the OPEC oil embargo of the United 
States, Congress amended the Export Administration Act of 1969 as a means to 
implement U.S. policy to use export controls as a means to secure the removel of 
restrictions imposed by foreign nations on U.S. access to supplies. 155 Second, in 
1977, Congress again amended a foreign policy declaration to the Export Ad-
ministration Act of 1969. The amendment authorized the President to use 
export controls "to encourage other countries to take immediate steps to prevent 
150. See Export Machinery, supra note 139 at 83-84. See also Abbot, supra note 140, at 758. The 
enactment of the 1969 Act significantly increased East-West trade. During the first year of the existence 
of the Act of 1969, the Commerce Department made available 1550 commodities in 775 Commodity 
Control List Categories for export to Soviet bloc countries. See DEP'T OF COMMERCE 95th QUAR-
TERLY REPORT, EXPORT CONTROL 5 (1971). 
151. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420. See also Abbot, supra note 140, at 857. 
152. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402 (1980) provides in part: 
(2) It is the policy of the United States to use export controls only after full consideration of 
the impact on the economy of the United States and only to the extent necessary -
(A) to restrict the export of goods and technology which would make a significant contribution 
to the military potential of any other country which would prove detrimental to the national 
security of the United States; 
(B) to restrict the export of goods and technology where necessary to further significantly the 
foreign policy of the United States or to fulfill its declared international obligations; 
(C) to restrict the export of goods where necessary to protect the domestic economy from the 
excessive drain of scarce materials and to reduce the serious inflationary impact of foreign 
demand. 
50 U.S.C. app. § 2402. 
153. See Export Machinery, supra note 139, at 84. 
154. See Abbot, supra note 140, at 857. For discussion of these provisions, see text accompanying notes 
2 14-39 infra. 
155. See Export Administration Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-500, § 4, 88 Stat. 1552 (expired 
in 1979). The EAA includes an almost identical provision. 50 U.S.c. app. § 2402(7). Legislative history 
shows that the 1973 oil embargo triggered congressional action. See S. Rep. No. 93-1024, 93d Cong., 2d 
Sess. 5, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CoDE CONGo & AD. NEWS 6234, 6238; 120 CONGo REc. 26, 55 (1974) 
(remarks of Sen. Stevenson). See generally Abbot, supra note 140. 
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the use of their territories or resources to aid, encourage, or give sanctuary to 
international terrorists."156 Third, the emergence of the United States as a 
proponent of human rights widened the scope of foreign policy export controls. 
In 1976, Congress declared that a principal goal of the foreign policy of the 
United States was "to promote the increased observance of internationally rec-
ognized human rights by all countries."157 This declaration explicitly expanded 
the purposes for which the United States could implement foreign policy con-
trols. 158 The enactment by Congress of the comprehensive foreign policy section 
of the EAA of 1979 signified the abandonment of the piecemeal approach used 
throughout the seventies. 159 
B. Definition of Technical Data Under the Export Administration Act of 1979 
The Export Administration Act of 1979 is similar to the Arms Export Control 
Act of 1976 in that the former provides the President with broad powers to 
control the flow of technical data from the United States. 160 With respect to 
controls on technology, Congress, in the EAA of 1979, stated the finding that 
it is important that the administration of export controls ... give 
special emphasis to the need to control exports of technology (and 
goods which contribute significantly to the transfer of such technol-
ogy) which could make a significant contribution to the military 
potential of any country or combination of countries which would be 
detrimental to the national security of the United States. 161 
In addition, the EAA of 1979 includes broad statements of policy justifying the 
restriction of technological exports. 162 Thus, Congress made a major innovation 
in this Act by attempting to focus national security controls on technology rather 
than on goods. 163 
156. See Export Administration Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-52, § 115,91 Stat. 235, 241 
(expired 1979) (current version at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402). 
157. International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-329, 
§ 301,90 Stat. 729, 748 (amending 22 U.S.C. § 2304) (amended 1978, 1979). See ge7lRrally, Abbot,supra 
note 140, at 776. 
158. See 22 U.S.c. § 2304; see ge7lRrally Abbot, supra note 140, at 776. 
159. See Export Machinery, supra note 139, at 112-13. In addition to responding to the political 
developments of the 1970's, the 1979 Act advanced some logistical and procedural reforms. The 1979 
Act extended the authority of the 1969 Act and the appropriations thereunder, improved the efficiency 
of export licensing that had suffered from increasing procedural delays, provided for a systematic 
review and revision of export control procedures, and revised the list of goods and technology subject to 
export control. See S. Rep. No. 169, 96th Congress, 1st Sess. 2-3, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 1147, 1149; see also Soviet Intervention, supra note 6, at 564. 
160. Compare 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 with 22 U.S.C. § 2778. 
161. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2401. 
162. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420. 
163. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401(8), 2404(d); see generally, Abbot, supra note 140. Indicative of this 
increased concern over technology controls is the statute's requirement that the Secretary of Defense 
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The Commerce Department has primary responsibility for promulgating reg-
ulations under the EAA.164 Although the general provisions of the Export 
Administration Regulations apply to technical data as well as to commodities,l65 
the Commerce Department has promulgated special regulations to control the 
export of technical data in accordance with the policy of the statute. 166 For 
purposes of the 1979 Act, Congress defined "technical data" to mean "informa-
tion of any kind that can be used, or adopted for use, in the design, production, 
manufacture, utilization, or reconstruction of articles or materials."167 The tech-
nical data may be in tangible form, such as a prototype, blueprint or manual, or 
in intangible form, such as know-howl6B or the performance of technical ser-
vices. 169 
An export occurs whenever a person either physically sends technical data 
abroad or releases it in the United States with the knowledge or intent that the 
data will be transmitted to a foreign country.170 Any release of technical data of 
U.S. origin by a person in a foreign country also constitutes an export subject to 
licensing. 171 Such a "release" of technical data may occur through a number of 
circumstances such as: (1) any visual inspection of equipment and facilities 
originated in the United States; (2) verbal communication; or (3) the application 
abroad of personal knowledge or technical expertise acquired in the United 
States. 172 
develop a "critical technologies" list. The statute requires the Secretary of Defense to develop the list 
with primary emphasis given to: 
(A) arrays of design and manufacturing know-how, 
(B) keystone manufacturing, inspection and test equipment, and 
(C) goods accompanied by sophisticated operation, application, or maintenance know-how, which, if 
exported, would contribute significantly to the military potential of another country. 
The EAA requires the Militarily Critical Technologies List to become part of the Commodities Control 
List. See 50 U .S.C. app. § 2404; see generally Recent Developments, supra note 6, at 411. 
164. 50 U.S.c. app. § 2403(b). 
165. See 15 C.F.R. § 370. 
166. 15 C.F .R. § 379. The provisions of § 379 do not apply to "classified" technical data, i.e., technical 
data that has an officially assigned security classification (such as "top secret," "secret" or "confidential"). 
The Office of Munitions Control of the State Department controls the export of classified technical 
data. 15 C.F.R. § 379.1 n.2; see text accompanying notes 114-16 supra. 
167. 15 C.F.R. § 379.1. While the definitions under both Acts appear similar, technical data under 
the Arms Export Control Act must relate to an article on the Munitions List. 22 C.F.R. § 125.01. See text 
accompanying notes 54-57 supra. Under the Export Administration Act, technical data need not meet 
such a condition. Technical data under the 1979 Act includes any unclassified information related to 
any industrial process. 15 C.F.R. § 379.3; see generally U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A SUMMARY OF U.S. 
EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS (Oct. 1981). 
168. 15 C.F.R. § 379.1(a). Van Hee, held that "technical data" under the Arms Export Control Act of 
1976 encompasses general knowledge and expertise. See text accompanying notes 67-81 supra. Under 
the Export Administration Act of 1979, no room for judicial interpretation exists; "technical data" 
explicitly includes general knowledge and expertise. 15 C.F.R. § 379.1(a). 
169. 15 C.F.R. § 379.1(a). 
170. 15 C.F.R. § 379.1(b)(I). 
171. /d. 
172. 15 C.F.R. § 379.1(b)(2). 
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C. Licensing Under the Export Administration Act of 1979 
The EAA of 1979 authorizes the President to delegate licensing authority to 
appropriate executive agencies and departments.!73 The Commerce Depart-
ment maintains primary licensingjurisdiction over commodities and unclassified 
technical data.!74 The export licensing system administered by the Commerce 
Department applies to: (1) exports of commodities and technical data from the 
U.S.;!75 (2) reexports of U.S. origin commodities and technical data from a 
foreign destination;176 (3) U.S. origin parts and components used in a foreign 
country in the manufacture of a foreign end-product or export;l77 and 
(4) foreign-produced products that are the direct result of U.S. origin technical 
data. 178 The purpose of the system is to prohibit, with few exceptions, all exports 
from the United States to any destination unless licensed by the Office of Export 
Administration (OEA) of the Commerce Department. 179 
Most American exports leave the country under a "general license" which is a 
license of general applicability that permits the export of commodities which are 
essentially peaceful in nature. 180 For commodities requiring stricter controls, the 
Commerce Department issues a "validated" license. 18 ! Whether a particular 
commodity requires a validated license depends upon whether the Commerce 
Department has listed the particular commodity on the Commodities Control 
List (CCL).!82 The CCL is a complete listing of commodities subject to licensing 
control by the Office of Export Administration.!83 The CCL is the key to 
determining whether a person may export a specific shipment under an estab-
lished general license authorization, or under a validated export license.!84 The 
173. 50 U .S.C. app. § 2403(e). 
174. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2409(a)(I)(2) (1980). The legislation requires. however. that prior to imposing 
controls to further the foreign policy or national security interest of the United States. the Secretary of 
Commerce consult with the Secretaries of State and Defense. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2409(a)( 1)(2) (1980). 
175. 15 C.F.R. § 379. 
176. Id. Reexport of technical data means "an actual shipment or transmission from one country to 
another, or any release of technical data of U.S. origin in a foreign country with the knowledge or intent 
that the data will be shipped or transmitted to another foreign country." 15 C.F.R. § 379.1. 
177. /d. 
178. [d.; 15 C.F.R. § 370; see generally U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A SUMMARY OF EXPORT ADMINISTRA-
TION REGULATIONS (Oct. 1981). 
179. See 15 C.F.R. § 370.3(a). The principal exceptions are: (I) nearly all exports to Canada for 
consumption there, id. at § 370.3(a)( I); (2) exports regulated by another U.S. agency, id. at § 370.3(a)(3); 
(3) certain exports to U.S. armed forces, id. at § 370(a)(2); and (4) exports to territories, dependencies, 
and possessions of the U.S., id. at § 370.4. 
180. 50 U .S.C. app. § 2403(a)(3); 15 C.F.R. § 371.3. For a listing of other types of general licenses 
applicable to particular products, see 15 C.F.R. § 371, 15-22. 
181. 15 C.F.R. § 372.2(a). 
182. The Export Administration Act of 1979 authorizes the Secretary of Commerce to establish a list, 
referred to as the "Commodities Control List," which comprises the goods and technology subject to 
control under the Act. The Commodities Control List can be found at 15 C.F.R. § 399.1. 
183. Id. 
184. 15 C.F.R. § 372.2(a). 
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ease with which an exporter may obtain a license depends in large measure on 
the destination of the export. 185 
Individuals may export technical data pursuant to either a general or a 
validated license. 186 Exporters have authorization under a general licensel87 to 
export data that is already generally available to the public, or is of a scientific or 
educational nature not significantly related 188 to industrial processes. 189 Techni-
cal data not included under the general license requires a validated license for 
export. 190 The Office of Export Administration of the Commerce Department 
issues validated export licenses upon receipt of an export license application. 191 
The applicant must disclose to the OEA all details of the transaction including 
the parties to the transaction, the destination and type of technical data to be 
exported, the intended use of the technical data and the foreign availability l92 of 
comparable technical data. 193 The OEA, on a case-by-case basis, uses this infor-
mation to determine whether it will grant a validated license. 194 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF CURRENT CONTROLS ON TECHNOLOGICAL EXPORTS 
Exporters generally recognize that export restrictions of some technical data 
are necessary for national security and foreign policy reasons. 195 However, 
exporters object to the scope and application of the export restrictions. 196 First, 
the breadth of the restrictions on technology transfers does place a limit on 
185. 50 U.s.C. app. § 2414 (1980); 15 C.F.R. § 370 Supp. 1. For export control purposes, the 
regulation divides all destinations into country groups. Country Group Z includes North Korea, 
Vietnam, Cambodia and Cuba. Group Y includes the U.S.S.R. and other Warsaw Pact countries. Group 
T consists of the countries of the Western Hemisphere, other than Canada and Cuba. Other 
classifications are Group W (Poland and Hungary), Group Q (Romania), and Group P (The People's 
Republic of China). Group V consists of all countries not included in any other country group. 15 C.F.R. 
§ 370 Supp. J. 
186. 15 C.F.R. § 379.2. 
187. See text accompanying note 204 infra. 
188. The regulations do not define what constitutes a "significant relationship." A reasonable infer-
ence is that the Commerce Department left the term undefined so as to provide the Department with 
discretion similar to that under the Edler standard. See text accompanying notes 105-14 supra. 
189. 15 C.F.R. § 379.3. 
190. 15 C.F.R. § 379.5(a). 
191. Id. 
192. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403(c). 
,193. 15 C.F.R. § 379.5(d). 
194. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SUMMARY OF U.S. EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS (October 
1981). 
195. See Use of Export Controls and Export Credits for Foreign Policy Purposes: Hearings on the Increasing Use 
by the Executive Branch of Restrictions on U.S. Exports and Export Credits for the Purpose of Promoting Foreign 
Policy Objectives Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 
(1978) (statement of David Packard, Chairman of the Board, Hewlett-Packard) [hereinafter cited as 
Export Controls and Credits Hearings l; see also Right to Export, supra note 6, at 264-65. 
196. Export Controls and Credits Hearings, supra note 195, at 45 (statement of Donald J. Morfee, 
Vice-President, Pullman, Inc.). 
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freedom of speech and the dissemination of ideas. 197 For example, Commerce 
Department regulations restrict exporters from communicating with foreign 
customers regarding technical matters without government approval. 198 These 
restrictions apply whether the exchange of information is to occur orally, in 
person or by telecommunication, or by exchange of documents. 199 These restric-
tions raise substantial first amendment questions. Although U.S. v. Edler held 
that the government's national security interest in regulating technical data 
"significantly related" to munitions outweighed first amendment consid-
erations,20o the court left open the question of whether technical data unrelated 
to munitions will receive first amendment protection. 201 However, the Edler 
court's emphasis on the military significance of the carbon composites trans-
ferred by Edler leads to a reasonable inference that the more attenuated the 
connection between technical data and its military nature becomes, the greater 
the possibility of first amendment protection.202 A court has yet to interpret 
technical data as defined by the Commerce Department. Thus, the question 
remains whether the regulations imposed under the Export Administration Act 
of 1979, which subject technical data related to any industrial processes to 
licensing, will receive the same degree of judicial deference that the munitions 
control regulations received in U.S. v. Edler. 203 
A second objection of the exporting community is its assertion that broad 
restrictions on exports of technical data are detrimental to U.S. domestic pol-
icy.204 Former Secretary of State Dean Rusk expressed this concern when he 
said: 
Trade occurs when it is of benefit to both parties. When we refuse to 
trade for security or political reasons, we should recall that we are 
depriving ourselves of the benefits of that trade, whether in the form 
of convertible currencies or goods and services which we ourselves 
need for our national life. 20 ;; 
Exporters recognize that export restrictions on sensitive technical data are im-
pOl·tant when comparable technology is either unavailable from other nations or 
subject to similar restraints within the multilateral framework of the Coordinat-
ing Committee on Export Controls (COCOM).206 However, when non-American 
197. Edler, 579 F.2d at 520. 
198. 15 C.F.R. § 379 Supp. I; see also U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, EXPORT CONTROL OF TECHNICAL 
DATA (Mar. 1981). 
199. 15 C.F.R. § 379 Supp. I. 
200. Edler, 579 F.2d at 521. 
20 I. See generally Soviet Intervention, supra note 6. at 561, 573; Berman & Garson,supra note 6, at 829. 
202. See Soviet Intervention, supra note 6, at 573; Berman & Garson, supra note 6, at 829. 
203. See Soviet Intervention. supra note 6, at 573. 
204. Export Controls and Credits Hearings, supra note 195, at 146. 
205. Export Controls and Credits Hearings, supra note 195, at 146 (statement of former Secretary of 
State Dean Rusk). 
206. Id.; see also Right to Export, supra note 6, at 264-65. 
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companies are able to fill the orders that American companies cannot fill simply 
because of unilateral restrictions by the U,S, government, the American expor-
ters lose customers in the international market. 207 In addition to this economic 
consequence, representatives of private industry point out that the increasing 
development of technology by other nations defeats the practical usefulness of 
many US, restrictions,20B The practical usefulness of restricting a technology 
export to a particular country disappears when that same country has already 
developed or received the technology being controlled by the United States, 
A third objection of exporters is that red-tape and procedural delays in the 
export control administration act as hindrances to American business,209 For 
example, time-consuming procedures delay operations abroad for American 
technicians and engineers even when no reason exists to prohibit the disclosure 
of technical data or the use of technical skills,210 These procedural delays are 
207. Export Controls and Credits Hearings, supra note 195, at 146. House Science and Technology 
Comm. Chairman Don Fuqua disagrees. On January 20, 1981, Fuqua said that 
discussions with Japanese officials and tours of industrial facilities in Japan reinforced his 
belief that the United States needs to apply the technology it develops at home rather than 
export the technology and import the manufactured goods it produces.. If our own 
government and industrial leaders would demonstrate the interest in application of technology 
to our factories shown by the Japanese, we could compete in the international marketplace 
with any nation on earth. 
U.S. Export Weekly (BNA), No. 342, C-4 Oan. 27,1981). 
208. See, e.g., EXpMt Control Policy and Extension of the EXpMt Administration Act: Hearings Before the 
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Part II, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 86 (1979) (statement of 
W. Robert McLellan, Vice-President, FMC Corp.) [hereinafter cited as 1979 Hearings]; Expo,-t Controls 
and Credits Hearings, supra note 195 at 24 (statement of David Packard, Chairman of the Board, 
Hewlett-Packard); id. at 45 (statement of DonaldJ. Murfee, Vice-President, Pullman, Inc.); Uf. at 318-19 
(statement of John V. James, Chariman of the Board, Dresser Industries). For an official expression of 
the view that the steady decline in U.S. productivity growth has caused the United States now to have 
the slowest growth rate of any industrialized country, see U.S. Export Control Policy and Extension of the 
EXpMt Administration Act: Hearings BefMe the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 
Part f, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1979) (statement of Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General) [hereinafter 
cited as 1979 Hearings, Part fl. But cJ. 1979 Hearings, Part f at 153-54 (statement of C. Fred Bergsten, 
Assistant Secretary of Treasury for International Affairs) (U.S. performance in export of technology-
intensive goods remains strong due to U.S. position as by far the most important performer of 
industrial research and development in the West). See also excerpt from a study issued by the Rand 
Corp. in Aug. 16, 1981: 
The case for export controls is strongest in areas in which the United States has a clear lead 
over other Western countries. As one moves outside this zone toward technologies that afford 
the'Soviets longer-term industrial gains and that are not areas of clear American superiority 
over the rest of the West, the benefits of export controls becomes more diffuse and uncertain, 
while the costs of trying to enforce them become progressively greater. Any widening of export 
controls outside the first range into the second should be undertaken only with the greatest 
care. 
TA"E GUSTAFSON, SELLING THE RUSSIANS ROPE? SoVIET TECHNOLOGY AND U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS, 
(Aug. 16, 1981) cited in U.S. Export Weekly (BNA), No. 370, A-4 (Aug. 18, 1981). 
209. See Van Hee Case Comment, supra note 6, at 107; see also U.S. Export Weekly (BNA), No. 312, 
C-7 (Dec. 9, 1980), and No. 336, A-4 (Dec. 9, 1980) for a discussion of p;oposed bills that would attempt 
to abolish the Commerce Department and set up a separate Department of International Trade, and 
combine the various export bills into a single package. The proposals have been unsuccessful due to the 
Reagan Administration's hesitancy to support any increase in the size of government. See U.S. Export 
Weekly (BNA), No. 341, B-1 Oan. 20, 1981). 
210. See Van Hee Case Comment, supra note 6, at 107. 
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costly in that they cause considerable losses of present export orders and give 
foreign purchasers reason to question the reliability of American businesses as 
future suppliers. 211 Finally, exporters point out that denials of license applica-
tions or revocations of previously-granted licenses212 are the most obvious 
sources of economic losses. The overall economic costs of export restrictions 
include lost revenues, unemployment and losses of future orders.213 
V. ANALYSIS 
Congress responded to exporters' criticisms with provISIons in the AECA214 
and the EAA215 which attempt to limit executive discretion in the export control 
area. Analysis demonstrates, however, that despite such provisions, and because 
of the decisions in United States v. Van Hee and United States v. Edler, no effective 
restraint on executive discretion exists in the area of technological exports. 
The AECA provides for two limitations on the Executive's power to issue 
licenses for commercial exports. First, if the State Department is considering 
issuing a license (1) for the sale of any defense articles or services216 valued at $35 
million or more, or (2) for the sale of major defense equipment217 valued at $7 
million or more, the President must submit a report to Congress not less than 
thirty days before granting the potential seller an export license. 218 The report 
must include the identity of the intended recipient of the proposed export, the 
dollar amount of the proposed sale and a description of the items to be ex-
ported.219 Upon a request by the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives, the State Department must promptly supply any additional 
211. See 1979 Hearings, supra note 208, at 86. See also Right to Export supra note 6, at 273; Export 
Controls and Credits Hearings, supra note 195, at 146. 
212. For example, see discussion of the revocation of the controversial 1978 Dresser Industries 
license to sell equipment and know-how to the Soviet Vnion for the production of oil-well drill bits. V.S. 
Export Weekly (BNA), No. 336, A-4 (Dec. 9, 1980). 
213. See Right to Export, supra note 6, at 273. 
214. 22 V.S.c. §§ 2776(c); 2778(b). 
215. 50 V.S.C. app. §§ 2403(c); 2405(b); 2405(d); 2405(c). 
216. The term "defense article" includes: 
a) Any weapon, weapons system, munition, aircraft, vessel, boat or other implement of war; 
b) any property, installation, commodity, material, equipment, supply, or goods used for the 
purposes of making military sales; 
c) any machinery, facility, tool, material, supply or other item necessary for the manufacture, 
production, processing, repair, servicing, storage, construction, transportation, operation, or 
use of any article listed in this paragraph; and 
d) any component or part of any article listed in this paragraph. 
22 V.S.C.A. § 2794(3). "Defense services" include any service, test, inspection, repair, training, publica-
tion, technical or other assistance, or defense information, used for the purposes of making military 
sales. 22 V.S.C.A. § 2794(4). 
217. The term "major defense equipment" means any item of significant combat equipment on the 
V.S. Munitions List having a nonrecurring research and development cost of more than $50 million or a 
total production cost of more than $250 million. 22 V.S.C.A. § 2794(b). 
218. 22 V.S.C.A. § 2776(c). 
219. !d. 
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information. 220 To the extent specified in such a request, and in consultation 
with the Secretary of Defense, the President must set forth the capabilities of the 
export items, an estimate of the number of U.S. personnel who will travel to a 
foreign country in connection with the sale of the export items, and an analysis 
of the arms control impact of the sale. 22I However, this reporting requirement 
fails to serve as an effective restraint on executive discretion in the area of 
technological exports. This reporting requirement is for informational purposes 
only;222 it does not give Congress a veto power over the proposed export. 223 
Second, Congress imposed a limitation on the ability of exporters to enter into 
high-value commercial sales. 224 Specifically, the Arms Export Control Act pro-
vides that exporters may not receive licenses for the export of any major defense 
equipment sold under a contract of $35 million or more.225 Congress enacted 
this limitation in order to subject the sale of significant amounts of major combat 
equipment to the more rigorous supervision and control system outlined for 
Foreign Military Sales. 226 The result of the limitation is that all sales of major 
defense equipment valued at $35 million or more must go through the FMS 
program and private sellers cannot deal directly with foreign governments in 
such instances.227 By these limitation provisions, Congress maintains some 
supervision over commercial exports,228 although the executive branch retains 
primary control in this area. 229 
The EAA also contains provisions that purport to limit executive discretion. 
One substantive limitation on executive authority is a general limitation based on 
220. [d. 
221. [d. The policy of the United States is to encourage arms control and discourage arms rac·es. 22 
u.s.c. § 2751. Thus, the State Department analyzes sales of munitions in terms of their impact on these 
policy goals. A significant reduction in U.S. arms exports is likely to contribute meaningfully to world 
arms control. For example, on May 19, 1977, President Carter indicated that because of the tremendous 
volume of arms sold by the United States (as of May 19, 1977, the U.S. accounted for over half of the 
total $20 billion in world arms sales), a policy to restrain U.S. arms transfers was necessary to encourage 
world arms control. 13 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 756 (1977). 
222. 22 U.S.C. § 2776(c). The conference committee rejected the Senate version of the AECA which 
would have granted Congress a thirty day review period, during which it could reject any proposed 
license for the export of defense equipment valued at $7 million or more. See H.R. CONF. REp. No. 1546, 
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 38-40 (1978). 
223. H.R. 13680, 94th Congress, 2d Sess., 122 Congo Rec. 13457 (1976). Congress realized that it was 
not providing itself with a veto power over commercial sales of equipment for less than $25 million.Id. 
See also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1546, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 38-40 (1978). 
224. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(b). 
225. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(b). This prohibition does not apply to members of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, Australia, Japan or New Zealand. [d. 
226. H.R REp. No. 1144, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); see also Sherzer, supra note 15. The provisions 
that provide for direct and extensive U.S. government supervision over foreign military sales are 
contained in 22 U.S.c. §§ 2761-2777 (1980). 
227. Sherzer, supra note 45, at 556. 
228. 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 2776, 2778; see also H.R. REp. No. 1144, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); H.R. 13680, 
94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONGo REC. 13457 (1976); see generally Sherzer, supra note 45. 
229. See text accompanying notes 113-33 supra. 
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foreign availability. The President may not impose export controls for foreign 
policy or national security purposes on items that he determines to be available 
without restriction in significant quantities, and of comparable quality from 
foreign sources. 230 The effect of this provision is questionable because an excep-
tion to this limitation allows the President to impose controls if he finds adequate 
evidence demonstrating that the absence of such controls would prove detrimen-
tal to U.S. foreign policy or national security.231 The legislative history of the 
EAA shows that this exception allows the President to impose export controls 
despite foreign availability.232 However, if the President implements the excep-
tion, he must initiate negotiations with other countries to try and remove the 
foreign availability. 233 
Congress further attempted to limit executive authority by providing a list of 
factors that the President must consider before imposing any foreign policy 
export control. The President must consider (1) the probability that the controls 
will achieve the intended foreign policy purpose; (2) the compatibility of the 
proposed control with the foreign policy objectives of the United States and with 
overall U.S. policy toward the proposed target country; (3) the reaction of other 
countries to the proposed control; (4) the likely effects of the proposed control 
on the export performance of the United States, on the competitive position of 
the United States in the international economy, on the international reputation 
of the United States as a supplier of goods and technology and on individual 
American companies and their employees and communities; (5) the ability of the 
United States to enforce the proposed controls effectively; and (6) the foreign 
policy consequences of not imposing controls. 234 These factors fail to serve as 
effective restraints on executive discretion. The Act requires the President only 
to consider the factors; they are not mandatory criteria that must be met. 233 
After the President considers these factors, he is free to disregard any of 
them. 236 
Another provision in the EAA requires the President to determine, prior to 
imposing export controls, that "reasonable efforts have been made to achieve the 
purposes of the controls through negotiations or other alternative means."237 
230. 50 u.s.c. app. § 2403(c). 
231. [d. 
232. S. REP. No. 96-169, 96th Cong., 1st Sess .• 8-9, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 
1147,1155. 
233. !d. 
234. 50 U.S.c. app. § 2405(b). 
235. S. REP. No. 96-169, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 
1147, 1154. See generally Abbot, supra note 140, at 866. 
236. S. REP. No. 96-169, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 
1147,1154. The Report states that the factors "would not preclude the President ... from imposing or 
maintaining export controls regardless of his conclusions" respecting their relevance. !d. See generally 
Abbot. supra note 140, at 866. 
237. 50 U.s.C. app. § 2405(d). 
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However, this requirement is an empty one because the EAA allows the Presi-
dent, in a report submitted to Congress after the imposition of a control, to give 
reasons for not having attempted negotiation or other alternative means. 238 
The provisions described show that Congress, while purporting to limit execu-
tive control on commercial exports, has actually protected executive discre-
tion. 239 In addition, as noted earlier, Congress has authorized the executive 
branch to define technical data for purposes of export regulation. Under this 
authority, the President and the executive departments have adopted broad 
definitions of "technical data." The Van Hee and Edler decisions provided sup-
port for these broad definitions and bolstered the ability of the executive branch 
to maintain discretion in this area. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Arms Export Control Act of 1976 and the Export Administration Act of 
1979 restrict the flow of technological exports from the United States. The 
history of these Acts indicates that restrictions are appropriate because of the 
U.S. interest in protecting national security and furthering foreign policy objec-
tives. To achieve these objectives, Congress has allowed the State and Commerce 
Departments to use considerable discretion in defining and regulating technical 
data. The limited case law in the area evidences the Judiciary'S deference to the 
executive branch in matters of national security or foreign policy. A court has yet 
to delineate the boundaries of first amendment protection in the area of techno-
logical exports. For these reasons, the State and Commerce Departments are 
able to maintain strict controls on exports of technology. 
American companies have strongly criticized the scope and application of 
these export controls. Private exporters correctly claim that restrictions on tech-
nological exports interfere with international communication and cause 
economic losses for American industries. Congress has reacted to these com-
plaints by providing safeguards in the AECA of 1976 and the EAA of 1979 
which take into account the likely effects of proposed controls on American 
companies. 
Even with these safeguards, the executive branch maintains broad discretion 
over technological exports. Private industry will most likely continue to criticize 
the scope and application of controls on technological exports. 240 The private 
sector, however, must comprehend that decisions to control exports of technol-
ogy are not a matter of pure economics. Selling technology reflects a political 
decision made by the U.S. government to confer or withhold an advantage upon 
238. 50 U.S.c. app. § 2405(e)(2). 
239. See Abbot, supra note 140, at 873. 
240. See U.S. Export Weekly (BNA), No. 359, C-2 (May 26, 1981). 
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a foreign nation in light of foreign policy and national security objectives. 241 
Decisions of such a political nature are bound to create uncertainty for private 
industry, but significant technology transfer decisions should be made by those 
responsible for our national interests, and not by those intended to maximize 
profits.242 
Patrick J. Monahan 
241. See Abbot, supra note 140, at 873. 
242. [d.; see Right to Export, supra note 6, at 297-99. 
